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A SYMPOSIUM:
Ethical Issues in Settlement
Negotiations

Those Who Worry About the Ethics
of Negotiation Should Never be
Viewed as Just Another Set of
Service Providers
by Lawrence J. Fox*
It is an honor to address this distinguished group of lawyers and law
students this evening as part of the very first Symposium funded by the
duPont Company's generosity by way of Judge Lawson. The issues

* Partner in the firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath. Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of Pennsylvania Law School. University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 1965; LL.B., 1968).
This Article is adopted from a keynote address I delivered on March 9, 2001, at the
Walter F. George School of Law's Symposium on Ethical Issues in Settlement Negotiations.
If I had spoken at this length on these issues then, an audience revolt would have occurred.
No one put similar restraints on the written word.
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raised by the topic of ethics in negotiation mirror some of the most
important themes in the bigger professional responsibility arena, and
examining them with this level of care can inform the profession more
widely.
It is ironic then that when Professor Pat Longan invited me to give the
keynote address, he himself negotiated my appearance in a highly
questionable manner. "Would I like to be the keynote speaker at this
upcoming Symposium?" Would I? Of course, being so self-absorbed that
I never turn down a chance to preach. "Yes," I shot back. "Love to."
But now I am here and I learn that this keynote address is being
given, not at the beginning of the Symposium, but when the Symposium
is half-way completed, that I am speaking after a delicious dinner,
complete with ample quantities of wine, that my speech follows an
eloquent address from Frank Cater Jones, the legendary Macon native,
Mercer Law School graduate, King & Spalding partner, and former
President of the American College of Trial Lawyers, and that this
weekend features the ACC basketball tournament, which means many
in this audience cannot wait to get back to their televisions. The
thought did cross my mind that perhaps Pat omitted a few key facts
when we "negotiated" my appearance here at Mercer.
I am particularly pleased to be invited to participate in this event in
Georgia. I have had a splendid affinity with this state for a long time.
Perhaps it is because of the outstanding Commission on Professionalism
that the Georgia Supreme Court established years ago. Perhaps it is
because I am currently handling a death penalty case on behalf of
Tommy Lee Waldrip' who is incarcerated in a prison in Jackson just up
Route 75. Perhaps it is because of my many friends in the Georgia bar
or because I was lucky enough to steal my wife away from Georgia Legal
Aid.

I.

ETHICS OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Client Autonomy

A.

There are three themes in the Symposium that I find particularly
fascinating and worthy of highlighting. First, the whole question of
client autonomy is one the profession must revisit in the negotiation
context. Too often lawyers take control of the client's matters in a way
that conflicts with the prerogatives of the client, particularly in the
negotiation process. While lawyers may well have a better view of the
best interests of the client, or at least think they do, the role of the

1.

Waldrip v. Head, Case No. 98-V-139 (Butts County Superior Court).
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lawyer as an agent of the client does not permit the lawyer to usurp the
authority of the lawyer's principle. Permit me to review seven areas of
client autonomy worth serious discussion.
First, as a general matter the client must authorize the initiation of
settlement discussions. Totally legitimate reasons exist why clients
would not want to discuss settlement. Regardless of what judges or
lawyers might think, a client can view, quite properly, the initiation of
settlement discussions as a sign of weakness. Corporate clients that face
multiple claims of the same type can adopt a policy that no cases of this
kind will ever be settled. Clients are entitled to have their cases tried
by judge and jury. Thus, absent some court-imposed requirement that
the parties engage in settlement, the lawyer needs the client's authority
to commence negotiations.
What about "off the record" negotiations? Can the lawyer who has not
discussed the possibility of negotiations or who has been told in no
uncertain terms not to commence them, tell the other side, "I have no
authority to discuss this topic, but I wouldn't be surprised if $300,000
would settle this case?" The statement is truthful as to the third party,
but the initiation has hardly been authorized by the client. These
discussions happen all the time, but whether they should is the kind of
question this Symposium must address. In my view those who would
argue that these settlement negotiations are impliedly authorized have
a very heavy burden in light of the client's authority over "the objectives
of the representation."2
Second, the client should be consulted about the means to be employed
as to how the negotiations are to proceed. If the client wants to settle
for $100,000, should the opening offer be $500,000? Should you wait
until the eve of trial to make an offer? Until the other side raises
settlement first? Until a key deposition has been taken? While the
rules say that the "lawyer shall consult with the client as to the means
by which [the client's ends] are to be pursued,"3 it is in rare cases that
the lawyer will spend much time on this sort of consultation. Even when
a discussion does take place, lawyers generally view the consultation as
"reporting in" rather than as a collaborative process. Is that, however,
the right result? It is true there is a lawyer component to how best to
proceed with negotiations. (Is this the juncture in the case at which the
client's case is strongest?) Negotiations, however, present a business
decision as to which the client may have even more expertise than the

2.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 cmt. c

(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by the client's decisions
concerning the objectives of the representation.").
3.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1995).
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lawyer, and in any event, the client has a stake in how the negotiations
are conducted as to both the amount of any offers and their timing.4
Third, it is critical that the client's confidences be kept, even in the
course of negotiations. At least in two ways this obligation is breached
on a fairly regular basis. First, lawyers often forget that their client's
"bottom line" is itself confidential information. Judges should not ask
for that information, but they regularly do so.' The opposing party is
always in search of that number. But if a lawyer fails to obtain consent
from the client before negotiations begin, then this key fact remains one
that should not be shared with anyone. Lawyers, of course, can avoid
the problem by responding with the answer to a different question. ("My
client needs at least $2,000,000," or "less than $2,000,000 is an insult.")
But if finesse is not an option, the answer is no disclosure.
Equally problematic is the common practice of lawyers sharing with
judges, mediators, or the other side their difficulty with getting the
client to be realistic about settlement. Sometimes that disclosure is
simply a ploy to take the blame off of the lawyer and, therefore, is itself
a questionable representation; but if it reflects the truth, it clearly is the
disclosure of confidential information, an indication that the negotiations
between lawyer and client have failed, and a disparagement of the client
that is impermissible under the rules of professional conduct.
Fourth, no matter how insulting, all settlement offers should be
communicated to the client. Rule 1.4's requirements, as unhelpful as its
key word "status" may be, surely include this information within the
mandatory client reporting obligations.' And well it should. While it

4. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4 provides: "(a) A lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."
5. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370
(1993).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4. Comment [11 of this rule
provides in relevant part: "A lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of
settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case should
promptly inform the client of its substance unless prior discussions with the client have left
it clear that the proposal will be unacceptable." The proposal of the ABA Commission on
the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000 Commission) is more
helpful:
(a) A lawyer shall (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is
required by these Rules; (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means
by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (4) promptly comply with
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is great bluster to tell the other side how inadequate the offered pittance
is in this case, the client's learning of the settlement offer may sober the
client or, at a minimum, trigger a desire by the client, despite the
lawyer's advice not to dignify the offer with a counter, to respond with
some counter proposal.
Fifth, the unambiguous principle-not subject to debate but well worth
emphasizing-is that the client's interests must come first. If the lawyer
has put in tens of thousands of dollars in time and the offer will give the
lawyer a "loss," the lawyer nonetheless must accept the client's decision
to settle once that decision is reached. Similarly, if the settlement offer
is generous and the lawyer would be handsomely rewarded but the client
wishes to press forward to trial, that decision too is solely the client's
and must be honored by the lawyer, no matter how much the lawyer is
convinced that trial could yield a goose egg.
Similar conflicts arise for defense counsel who may be enjoying the
lucrative benefits of defending a "bet the company case" but whose client
has decided to settle, perhaps for far too much in the lawyer's view, but
with an eye to putting the matter behind it. Any conflict between
lawyer and client must be reviewed carefully under Rule 1.7(b)'s
requirement that any material limitation on the representation created
by the conflicting interest of the lawyer be addressed.7 The negotiation
conflict between lawyer and client is a classic example of this.
Sixth, the lawyer must avoid entering into any agreements with the
client that compromise any of these principles. If the client grants the
lawyer the authority to conduct the negotiations on the client's behalf,
that authority must be revocable at will.' The lawyer may not seek
agreement from the client that the lawyer may withdraw if the client
refuses a settlement the lawyer recommends.9 Nor can an agreement

reasonable requests for information; and (5) consult with the client about any

relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client
expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
7. Rule 1.7(b) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
parson, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client
consents after consultation.
8. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33. Comment

c provides that the client may "confer settlement authority on a lawyer, provided that the
authorization is revocable before a settlement is reached."
9. See Jones v. Ferger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27, 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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require both lawyer and client approval of a settlement." In each case
the client's autonomy is unfairly compromised, and, therefore, even
seeking this sort of condition impermissible.
Finally, only the client has the authority to settle the case. While the
other side may assume that the lawyer has authority and, therefore, a
settlement agreed to by the lawyer may be enforceable as to the client,
the client has a claim against the lawyer if an unauthorized settlement
is foisted upon the client."
B.

Truth In Negotiations

The second fascinating topic this Symposium will address is the role
of the lawyer in negotiations with third parties. Rule 4.1, as we all
know, states a lawyer may not make a "false statement of material fact
or law to a third person." On the other hand, as an earlier draft of the
Litigation Section Guidelines observed in language that is unfortunate
but highly evocative, there is a permissible area of "lawyer dissimulation" or puffing.' 2 The comments to Rule 4.1 acknowledge a convention
that lawyers may misrepresent in certain areas where, in effect, both
sides have agreed that each will violate Rule 4.1.13 Included within
this category is boasting about the strength of one's case or the
discussions about the minimum one's client will accept or the maximum
one's client will pay. This puffing, we are told, is totally permissible
because in these cases everyone has engaged in a collective wink.
Fingers crossed, I can lie that my client's bottom line is $25,000, and I
don't lose my ticket to practice when she, that very day, accepts $15,000.
But the line between the permissible and a violation of Rule 4.1 is not
always clear, and any time lawyers do make representations based on

10. See

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 33 cmt.

C.

11. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996). A lawyer is forbidden "to make a settlement without
the client's authorization. A lawyer who does so may be liable to the client or the opposing

party ...

and is subject to discipline." Id.

12. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, Section 4.1.1 (Draft
December 2000).
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. 2. Comment 2
provides:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally
accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not
taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the
subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of
a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal
except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.
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client information, the lawyer treads into uncertain territory. The
litigating lawyer really faces a particular ethical trap when the lawyer
becomes involved in settlement negotiations. Here is an advocate
prepared to do battle, presenting the client's cause using any proposition-factual or legal-that can be advanced in good faith,14 suddenly
placed in a negotiating posture in which Rule 4.1 obligations are
triggered, sometimes with no more of a transition than switching from
one sentence to the next. How lawyers manage this role transition may
be the difference between fulfilling one's professional responsibility and
potential liability for the lawyer.
C. Should Everything Be Negotiable?
A third issue this Symposium will address is the public policy as to
whether there should be limits on what is negotiable. I have identified
five policy concerns, but there may be others worth discussing.
First is what I have referred to in another context as "make him go
away." 5 The client is fed up with the lawyer on the other side and
urges her lawyer to pay extra money if the opposing lawyer will agree
never to take a position adverse to the client again. Variations on this
theme include proposals to make the "extra" payment directly to the
lawyer or for the client to retain the lawyer in a way that achieves the
same result.
All of these propositions appear to be violations of Rule 5.616 as
agreements placing restrictions on the right of opposing counsel to
practice law in the future. 17 But some commentators have suggested
that these restrictions are outdated and too paternalistic of lawyers."8
The conflicts created by these sort of offers, however, are real (as little

14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.").
15. See Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Tender: A Lawyer's Guide To Handling Professional
Dilmemmas, "Make Him Go Away," (Section of Litigation, American Bar Association 1995).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6. Rule 5.6 states:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a partnership or
employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after
termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon
retirement; or (b) an agreement in which a restriction of the lawyer's right to
practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.

Id.
17. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371
(1993).
18. See Stephen Gillers, A Rule Without Reason, 79 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 118, quoted
with approval in Feldman v. Minars, 658 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
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as one extra dollar to the client for the lawyer's future forbearance
creates a conflict between lawyer and client), and therefore, this area is
deserving of serious study.
Second, there is the "filthy" issue of attorney fees. In cases in which
the lawyer receives the fee, not from the client's recovery, but from the
court's determination under a statutory fee-shifting provision,"9 it is all
too easy for the opposing party to offer to settle at the client's exact
number, on the condition the lawyer waive any entitlement to, or limit
dramatically, the amount the lawyer seeks by way of a fee. Indeed, that
lawyer may have an ethical obligation to do so. Yet this offer creates the
same trap discussed above with respect to restrictions on the right to
practice, driving the lawyer from her client as much as if they were
opposing parties. With no thanks to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Evans v. Jeff D.,2° this sort of approach to negotiations is
permissible because, theoretically at least, it is said that the lawyer can
protect herself from this result by an agreement at case inception.
However, lawyers know that this view is not really the case and that
lawyers are regularly forced, in cases suffused with public policy
concerns, to waive any right to recover fees to achieve their clients' ends.
While we all agree that clients' interest must come first, Rule 5.6 reflects
a judgment that there can be situations in which that rule can work too
great a hardship. The attorney fee area, in my view, raises the identical
issues, and the Supreme Court's too facile approach to the problem, plus
lawyers' real life experience since then, suggests that this Symposium
might be a wonderful launch pad to addressing this issue anew, if not
here and now, then at one of the succeeding duPont symposia.
Third, fourth, and fifth are all issues relating to the interests of the
nonparty public in the settlement of litigation. May lawyers agree that
settlements are confidential when the information relating to the
settlement would surely be of real interest, as opposed to something of
curiosity, to third parties? I have in mind the settlement of a product
case in which there may be many more potential victims. The Ethics
2000 Commission certainly was importuned to have the Model Rules
declare that confidentiality agreements of this sort should be unethical. 2
Similarly, can lawyers agree to return documents and even undertake
never to use them again when the documents could well reflect on other
parties' potential claims? Here, I am thinking of a case against a

19. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).

20. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
21. Letter from Richard Zitrin, Esq. to Chief Justice Norman Veasey dated September
19, 2000, enclosing Proposed Rule 3.2(b) (on file with the author).
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broker-dealer whose salesman you suspect has led other investors
astray. Putting aside for a moment whether those conditions might be
restrictive enough of the lawyer's practice so as to violate Rule 5.6, is the
lawyer otherwise compromising an important public policy in acquiescing
in the return of the documents?
Finally, what if the lawyer observes criminal or unprofessional conduct
by the other side? At the present time lawyers are free to threaten
prosecution and agree to withhold it in order to secure a more favorable
outcome for the client22 and, except apparently in Illinois, treat the
professional misconduct of the opposing lawyer as subject to Rule 1.6's
prohibition on the disclosure of confidential information as a basis for
not reporting the misconduct.23 But is that balance correct? Should
the responsibility to report criminal conduct be lower than to report
professional misconduct?
This great question warrants further
discussion.
II. ETHICS 2000 EMANATIONS
I also wanted to share with you two issues that have been
presented to the Ethics 2000 Commission during our deliberations that
bear directly on the issues you are going to address at this Symposium.
The first involves Rule 4.1, which I discussed earlier. The Ethics 2000
Commission heard from a number of advocates, particularly those
practicing in the patent and trademark field, arguing that lawyers
should be permitted to send individuals into places of business posing as
customers, lessees, and/or employees for the purpose of unearthing or
confirming misconduct of one kind or another. 24 The proponents of
these ideas always come up with a poster child that is particularly
compelling, for example, sending in a matching pair of prospective
tenants to determine if the landlord is discriminating on the basis of
race. While all of them appear premised on good intentions, this
approach cannot mask two facts.
One, what is someone's holy crusade, viewed from the other side may
be totally unwarranted and intrusive conduct. Every self-righteous cry

22. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363
(1992).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c). This rule and comment [21
make clear that "[a] report about misconduct is not required where it would involve
violation of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure
where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests." Id.
24. See Draft Recommendation and Report dated May 1998 prepared by Representative
of the IPL Section to ABA Section/Division Committee on Professionalism and Ethics (on
file with author).
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that all they are doing is trying to uncover misconduct can be met with
equally strong denunciations of invasions of privacy and harassment.
And, two, whatever else is happening here, the lawyer who either poses
as a customer or sends someone else in to pose as a customer is engaging
in misrepresentation to a third party in violation of Rule 4.1.
As efficacious as it may be for lawyers to assist their clients in this
way, the Ethics 2000 Commission correctly rejected these attempts to
water down lawyers' truth-telling obligations as unethical. But if these
proponents persist, as I am sure they will, you can see how their
attempts to compromise Rule 4.1's prohibition would also have an effect
on the role of the lawyer under Rule 4.1 in negotiations.
One response to the Ethics 2000 Commission's rejection of the "testers"
proposal described above has been an end-run attempt by some to
compromise the prohibition in Rule 8.4 that provides that a lawyer may
not do "through the acts of another" that which would violate the rules
of professional conduct if done directly by the lawyer. Some have argued
to Ethics 2000 that this provision does not apply when the acts of
another, through whom the lawyer is violating the rules, are the acts of
the client. 2' For example, the argument has been made that, because
there is nothing illegal or improper about a client sending someone into
a wholesaler to pose as a department store buyer, the lawyer should be
free to counsel the client to do so directly rather than having the lawyer
do the posing or hiring the poser. This issue raises some troubling
questions, and even if it does not put lawyers over the edge, it certainly
puts them very close to it.
You can also see how this construct would have a direct impact on the
ethics of lawyers engaging in negotiation because, if it were to take on
a life of its own, lawyers could be counseling clients in the negotiation
context in violation of Rules 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3-the rules dealing
respectively with representations to third parties, contacts with
represented persons, and dealings with unrepresented persons-under
the rubric that the lawyer was simply giving the client advice of what
the client can do. As the Litigation Section Ethics of Negotiation project
goes forward, both of these issues should be reflected in the final
product.

25. Letter from Donald Hilliker, Esq., Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, to Ethics 2000 Commission, March 8, 2001 (on file with
author).

SYMPOSIUM SPEECH

20011

III.

987

MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES

Before I close, I want to address some issues that I consider far more
important and far more fundamental. While we as conscientious lawyers
are spending this time at Mercer Law School considering these very
important professional responsibility issues relating to negotiation,
events are proceeding apace to call into question whether we will have
a profession and whether, in holding a Symposium like this, we are
merely rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic while our professional
ship is running into an iceberg.
A.

Cognitor

To what do I refer? I have three distinct issues in mind. First, I want
you to think of just one word, "cognitor." How many people have
actually heard that word? I see just a couple. Well, I predict that before
long we will all be familiar with the word, and we will all rue the day we
first heard it. You see our friends at the accounting firms have decided
that we lawyers are just another set of service providers like auditors,
accountants, investment bankers, and title clerks. They have also
decided that the idea that lawyers are different or special or should be
subject to unique rules of professional responsibility is as quaint a notion
as the buggy whip. So they have invented a new term called "cognitor,"
which does not mean "know-it-all," but rather, I suppose, "wise person"
as a descriptive phrase to be applied to any educated person who
provides services to businesses.26
This watering down of our professional birthright comes from the
accounting firms with ill grace. As some of you realize, these firms have
systematically hired more than five thousand of our best and brightest,
a number that grows with each passing day. These lawyers leave their
firms on Friday evening and on Monday morning show up at the Big 5
providing the exact same services for the exact same clients, but they are
now not practicing law. Rather they are practicing "tax," "pension
consulting," "litigation support," or "mergers and acquisitions." Anything
but the practice of law. And why are they not practicing law? Because
if they were practicing law, they would have to follow the rules of
professional conduct, and they are not doing so; rather they are
systematically violating our rules governing sharing fees with nonlaw-

26. See Mark Hansen, A New Credential: CPA's 'Cognitor'Plan Draws Wary Response
from Bar, 87 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2001, at 18-19.
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yers, conflicts of interest, limitations on liability for
malpractice,
2v
restrictions on the right to practice, and confidentiality.
You can see how this approach to the use of the word "cognitor" makes
a mockery of the Symposium being held here. While we pride ourselves
on our hard work as we struggle with and worry about the ethics of
negotiation, we can be sure that no similar symposium is, or ever will be,
held at Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Arthur Andersen, or Commonwealth
Land Title Company.
B.

Is It the Practiceof Law If Others Can Do It?

The second development that I wish to share with you has arisen as
the ABA Multijurisdictional Practice Commission ("MJP") has confronted
the very real issues raised by the desire of clients and lawyers to permit
out-of-state counsel to conduct certain activities in jurisdictions in which
they are not admitted. I have in mind the depositions in California of
a case pending in New Jersey or the negotiation of a purchase by a New
York lawyer on behalf of a Delaware client of a Silicon Valley company.
Regardless of how dimly I viewed the MJP movement, until I read the
recent proposal adopted by the Council of the Business Law Section of
the ABA ("the Section"),28 it never occurred to me that what might be
at stake was the very existence of the profession. In advancing what has
to be the most far-reaching proposed expansion of multijurisdictional
practice yet suggested, the Section included in its proposal an idea so
pernicious and devastating to the future of the legal profession that its
mere breadth left me stunned. This provision would offer a safe harbor
for any lawyer to practice anywhere in the United States-even the
world-regardless of bar admission, the location of the client, or any
nexus to the jurisdiction, so long as the work being undertaken was
work that could be undertaken by a nonlawyer.
Anyone with a short memory will recall that this argument is one that
the accountants have used to justify the civil disobedience of the
thousands of lawyers they have hired. To support the proposition that
what these lawyers are doing is permissible, the Big 5 point to all the
nonlawyers who advise individuals and companies on tax matters,

27. For a more extensive discussion on these issues, see Lawrence J. Fox, Redefining
Lawyers' Work: MultidisciplinaryPracticeOld Wine in Old Bottles: PreservingProfessional
Independence, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 971 (1999); Lawrence J. Fox, The Future of the Profession:
A Symposium on MultidisciplinaryPractice: Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional
World: They Foul OurNest and Theirs Too, Plus OtherRuminations on the Issue of MDPs,
84 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2000).
28. Position Statement on Multijurisdictional Practice of ABA Section of Business Law
dated January 14, 2001 (on file with author).
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human resources, pensions, transactions, and trial preparation. Because
those nonlawyers are allowed to do this work, they contend, surely
lawyers can as well without following the rules of professional conduct
so long as lawyers make it clear that they are not practicing law. These
individuals may have bar admission certificates with huge embossed
seals they carefully place on their walls, and they may maintain bar
memberships and regale their future clients with their prior experience
at King & Spalding. But they are no longer lawyers; no, instead just
another set of service providers for whom the rules of professional
conduct are a mere nuisance and anachronism that can get in the way
of the natural growth of multidisciplinary firms to their oligopic level of
"efficient" size.
And now we find the Business Law Section giving aid and comfort to
this notion. So long as lawyers are providing services that look like
what nonlawyers do, who needs to worry about niceties like bar
admission and limiting one's practice to the jurisdiction in which one is
properly admitted when it gets in the way of the expansive views of
these high-powered lawyers who want to practice wherever they choose?
In doing so they tear down a fundamental lawyer value. It is certainly
true that much of what lawyers do is often undertaken by others.
Investment bankers work on mergers and acquisitions. Title companies
convey property, and realtors advise on the purchase of a sale of real
estate. Accountants, and others, prepare tax returns. Advertising
agencies prepare trial exhibits and conduct focus groups. Pension
advisers structure ERISA compliance plans. But this overlap does not
mean that when lawyers undertake these same tasks they are not
practicing law; they clearly are, and this truth means not only that the
lawyers bring to the endeavor their special training and experience, but
also the unique ethical obligations and protections reflected in our rules
of professional responsibility and our system of discipline to enforce
those obligations.
The question for the profession is whether our society needs and wants
lawyers to be cloaked with special responsibilities to our clients, the
courts, and the system of justice, or will society simply be better off if
lawyers are just another set of service providers with no special
educational requirements, bar admission requirements, code of conduct,
or commitment to fulfill the special rules expected of us now? Certainly
with the Business Law Section's proposal, its Council has taken a
decided vote for the latter. When lawyers do what others do, bar
admission requirements, in their view, should just be jettisoned. Let us
not go there because the proposal in itself is a bad idea, but far worse
because of its implications for the future of our profession.
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The last of these fundamental issues I want to address is again
prompted by the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association
that seems intent on single-handedly dismantling so much of what
makes our profession unique. A special ad hoc committee of that Section
submitted to the Ethics 2000 Commission a proposal that would end
imputation of conflicts of interest. 29 For those students in the audience
who are not schooled in these matters yet, imputation is that principle
that says that each lawyer who practices in a given practice setting must
honor the loyalty commitment of every other lawyer in that practice
setting. 0 As a result, if Dean Larry Dessem and I are practicing law
together, I may not take a position adverse to Dean Dessem's clients,
and similarly, Dean Dessem may not take a position adverse to my
clients.
In my view this approach to loyalty reflects the best our profession
offers. Not only do my clients receive my undivided loyalty, but they
know that all of my colleagues with whom I share a firm name, the
ability to call on anybody in our firm to work on a matter, and a
commitment to share the economic rewards of our joint practice will also
provide them with undivided loyalty as well."1
The accountants do it differently. They claim they have rules of
loyalty, but their conflict of interest regime bears no resemblance to
ours. All conflicts are personal. Each person working in an accounting
firm simply asks him- or herself whether he or she feels comfortable
taking on the assignment. Second, the evaluation of that question is
totally subjective. Unlike lawyers whose conduct is judged by a
reasonable lawyer's standard, in these situations for the accountants the
only question is what did the individual in fact think. In addition, for
the accountants there are no nonwaiveable conflicts, a stark contrast
from lawyers who are barred from taking on any representation that no
reasonable lawyer would undertake.3 2

29. Letter from Business Law Section Ad Hoc Committee on Ethics 2000, October 5,
1999 (on file with author).
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) ("While lawyers are
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.").
31. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see, Lawrence J. Fox, Dan's World:
A Free EnterpriseDream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55 Bus. LAW. 1533 (2000).
32. Written Remarks of Sam DiPiazza (Managing Partner, Tax Services-Americas
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) (March 11, 1999) (visited Apr. 12,2001) <http://www.abanet

.org/cpr/dipiazza.html>.
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You can see by this proposal, which fortunately the Ethics 2000
Commission has not endorsed, the Business Law Section seeks in yet
another way to make lawyers just another set of service providers. It
might be good for business (you would have less work to turn away), but
you could hardly say it was good for the clients or the profession.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Professor Pat Longan wanted me to be funny. I am afraid the
message here is anything but funny. But that does not mean that the
message is not hopeful or uplifting. Being a lawyer is a splendid
occupation. Law students can look forward to joining a remarkably
dedicated group of professionals who take quite seriously that lawyers
are special, not because they have special privileges, but because they
have special responsibilities. Part of those special responsibilities is
participating in a symposium like this one, symposia, as I have noted,
that are unlikely to take place among other occupational groups. But
while we are keeping one eye on these very important issues relating to
the ethics of settlement negotiations, we cannot afford to ignore these
other matters. Rather, we must organize ourselves now to repel the
Visigoths at our gates.

*

*

*

